We investigate time consistency of monetary valuations, also called monetary risk measures or monetary utility functions. Through a number of recent research contributions, it has become clear that time consistency imposes strong constraints on families of monetary valuations conditioned on available information at different time instants. In this paper we add to these results by showing that consistent families of monetary valuations are already determined uniquely by the choice of the initial valuation, under suitable sensitivity assumptions; moreover, this statement holds even when the term "consistency" is interpreted in a rather weak sense. The unique update rule is specified explicitly, and we characterize the existence of consistent updates for a given initial monetary valuation. We give examples of situations in which weak consistency is relevant. An application is given to the construction of consistent families of compound valuations, as an illustration of the additional flexibility under weak time consistency.
Introduction
Risk measures and more generally valuation functionals are used for various purposes, including regulation, margin setting, asset pricing, and contract design; see for instance [2, 8, 4, 11] . In many applications, it is of interest to apply valuations at different points in time. Updating rules and time consistency of convex and coherent risk measures have been investigated extensively in recent years; see for instance [15, 21, 24, 12, 10, 3] . Attention has been paid in particular to the notion of strong time consistency, also called dynamic consistency. We will argue below in subsection 3.4 that, while this notion has a solid intuitive foundation in some contexts, weaker notions of consistency can still be appropriate in particular in situations in which an inequality of valuations does not necessarily imply a preference relationship.
As argued in [22] , strong consistency inhibits the construction of families of risk measures that maintain comparable standards of prudence on different scales; a "VaR of VaR's", so to say, is likely to be very conservative. For related comments see also Schied [25, Remark 3.5] . In fact, it has been noted in the literature that many risk measures do not even allow strongly consistent updates. Klöppel and Schweizer [18, Section 7 .2] introduce a natural coherent risk measure based on one-sided moments, and show that it cannot be updated in a dynamically consistent way. A striking result by Kupper and Schachermayer [19] shows that, under mild technical conditions, law-invariant risk measures allow strongly time consistent updates only when they belong to the family of entropic risk measures, which is parametrized by a single scalar parameter.
Alternative, weaker notions of time consistency have been proposed and discussed in several papers, for instance [7, 22, 28, 27, 1, 5] . The main notions used in this paper are sequential consistency and conditional consistency. Both consistency notions have been introduced in [22] in the context of coherent risk measures defined on a finite outcome space. Sequential consistency is the central notion in this paper; it formalizes the idea that a position that is surely (un)acceptable at some future date should be deemed (un)acceptable already now. The importance of conditional consistency derives from the fact that, even under this weak form of consistency, updates are unique.
The uniqueness of updates, under suitable sensitivity assumptions, is one of the main results of the present paper. The result on uniqueness is supported by the construction of an operator that provides the update if it exists. This operator, called the refinement update, is a generalization of the well known Bayesian updating rule. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of consistent updates, and we show that consistent updating of an initial risk measure is enough to construct consistent families of risk measures. The paper concludes with an example of the construction of consistent families.
In this paper we consider the positions specified by payoffs (random variables) rather than by payoff streams (random processes) as for instance in [10] and [17] . As in most of the literature on risk measures, we shall limit ourselves to bounded random variables; methods for extending results from this case to the unbounded case are provided in [9] .
The literature on risk measures that has developed following the work of Artzner et al. [2] is marked by variations in sign conventions and terminology. The sign conventions that we use are the same as for instance in [10] : the outcomes of random variables are interpreted as gains, and positive values of functionals correspond to acceptable positions. The term "monetary utility function" that has been used in a number of recent papers is a little long-winded as noted by Jobert and Rogers [17] , and moreover does not quite match the view taken in this paper that valuations are not necessarily preference indicators. We follow the suggestion in [17] to use the term "valuation", even though this term may be less suitable for applications in regulation. The term "monetary" is added as a reference to the translation axiom that is used below, and in this way we arrive at the term "monetary valuation" for the class of functionals that we consider.
The paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries with mostly well known material are presented in Section 2. The notions of consistency that we use are defined in Section 3, which we conclude by two examples that motivate the relaxation of the standard concept. The refinement update is introduced in Section 4 as the unique candidate for a consistent update. Existence of such an update is addressed in Section 5. An example of the construction of a consistent family is shown in Section 6. Finally, conclusions follow in Section 7. Most of the proofs have been collected, together with a few auxiliary results, in the Appendix.
Basic definitions and properties
In this section we list some basic definitions and properties and fix notation. Most of the material is standard and the basic properties are well known (see for instance [12, 10, 14] ).
Standing assumptions and notation
We work in the standard setting of a fixed filtered probability space . ; F ;P;.F t / t 2T /; the parameter set T can be an interval OE0;T or a discrete set ¹t 0 ;t 1 ;:::;t n º, with t 0 D 0 and t n D T . We will always assume that F 0 is trivial and F T D F . The terms "measurable" and "almost surely" without further specification mean F -measurable and P -almost surely, respectively. The complement of an event F 2 F is denoted by F c . We write
Elements of L 1 will be referred to as random variables but also as "payoffs" or "positions". Convergence is taken in the almost sure sense unless indicated otherwise. All equalities and inequalities applied to random variables are understood to hold almost surely; the notation XˆY means that P .X Ä Y / D 1 and P .X < Y / > 0.
Given a nonempty set S L 1 , ess sup S is defined as the least element in the a.s.-equivalence classes of measurable functions from to R [ ¹1º that dominate all elements of S in the almost sure sense (see for instance [14] ); ess inf S is defined similarly. We use inf X and sup X to refer to the essential infimum and the essential supremum, respectively, of an element X of L 1 . We also use inf and sup in the usual sense to refer to the infimum and supremum of a collection of real numbers; this should not lead to confusion.
The set L 1 . ;F t ;P / of essentially bounded F t -measurable functions will be written as L 1 t . Conditional expectations under a probability measure Q P are usually written as E Q t X rather than as 
The class M t of conditional monetary valuations
We use the notation M t for the class of F t -conditional monetary valuations.
For elements of M 0 , i.e. mappings from L 1 to R, the term "unconditional monetary valuation" will sometimes be used. An element t of M t is called a concave F tconditional monetary valuation if it satisfies F t -concavity:
and t 2 M t is called coherent if it in addition satisfies F t -positive homogeneity: 
Under the normalization assumption, the local property is equivalent to F t -regularity [12, Proposition 1]:
Additional assumptions relating to monotonicity that will be used frequently are sensitivity (2.8) and strong sensitivity (2.9):
A mapping that is monotonic and strongly sensitive is said to be strictly monotonic. A mapping t is continuous from above if
A dynamic monetary valuation corresponding to the filtration .F t / t 2T is a family . t / t 2T with t 2 M t for each t 2 T . The class of dynamic monetary valuations for a given filtered probability space . ; F ;P;.F t / t 2T / is denoted by M T .
Acceptance sets and conditional requirements
The acceptance set of a normalized monotonic mapping
We will frequently write A t as an abbreviation of A. t /, when the mapping t is clear from context. The acceptance set of an F t -conditional monetary valuation satisfies three properties that we express here for a general set S L 1 , namely acceptance of zero (2.11), solidness (2.12), and F t -nonnegativity (2.13):
Below we shall refer to these three properties as the "basic conditions". Such acceptance sets always have the F t -local property (2.14) and the F t -closedness property (2.15):
The F t -closedness property follows from the inequality
The five conditions (2.11-2.15) are not only necessary but also sufficient for a set S L 1 to be the acceptance set of an F t -conditional monetary valuation. The proposition below, obtained from [12] and [10] , states this fact and also explains how to relate a conditional monetary valuation to a subset S satisfying only the basic conditions. That construction relies on the notion of a conditional capital requirement, introduced in [12] , which associates to an arbitrary set S L 1 the mapping from
For the convenience of the reader, the proof of the proposition is summarized in the Appendix. The acceptance set of a concave valuation is convex, and in fact satisfies the stronger property of F t -convexity which is expressed as follows:
Proposition 2.2 A set
Sensitivity of a conditional monetary valuation t is reflected by the property of negative cone exclusion:
For later reference, we identify two properties that represent distinct features of the F t -local property (2.14). The first property, closedness under F t -isolation, is related to restricting a given position, while the second, F t -complementarity, relates to joining two mutually exclusive positions. These two properties are expressed as follows: Proof: First, assume that S has the local property. For any X 2 S and F 2 F t , we
we see that the local property implies that X 2 S.
Conversely, assume now that S is closed under F t -isolation and has the F t -complementarity property. Take X; Y 2 S, and F 2 F t , and write 
The condition (3.1a) is known as "weak acceptance consistency" [7, 13, 26] while the property (3.1b) has been called "weak rejection consistency" [26] . We shall use the simpler terms acceptance consistency and rejection consistency instead. The combination of the two properties, which we refer to as sequential consistency, was used by Weber in a study of distribution-invariant risk measures [28] . 
Proof: Clearly, property (i) is implied by sequential consistency. For any X 2 L 1 we have t .X t .X // D 0, so that property (ii) is implied by property (i). If property (ii) holds, then for any X 2 L 1 we have
and likewise s .X / sup t .X / Ä 0, so that (iii) is satisfied. Finally, it is immediate that property (iii) implies sequential consistency.
The notion of strict sequential consistency is defined as sequential consistency with the added requirement
It is easily verified that under strong sensitivity this is equivalent to sequential consistency. 
Strong time consistency
A characterization in terms of acceptance sets is given in [13] . The definition of strong time consistency is sometimes given in the form of one of the following equivalent implications:
Under F t -translation invariance, these conditions are both equivalent to the definition above, as can be seen by taking Y D t .X /, cf. [1, Proposition 1.16]. It is immediately clear from the definitions that strong time consistency implies sequential consistency. Reasons for considering the weaker notion will be discussed in Subsection 3.4 below.
Conditional consistency
Finally we introduce a notion that is even weaker (under suitable sensitivity assumptions) than sequential consistency. This notion plays a key role in uniqueness of updating. 
Definition 3.4 Let be given
The condition in the definition states that approval of a position at level t is equivalent to approval at the aggregate level s not only of the position itself, but also of its isolated versions where isolation is taken up to level t.
In order to describe the notion of conditional consistency in terms of acceptance sets, we introduce the following construction.
The set S t can be described alternatively as the largest subset of S that is closed under F t -isolation. Definition 3.5 has been used before by Tutsch [26, p. 88 ], in the situation in which the set S is the acceptance set A s of a monetary valuation s 2 M s . She refers to this set, which we denote by A t s , as the acceptance set of s with respect to F t . Conditional consistency can now be formulated compactly as the requirement that
Since the acceptance set A t is closed under F t -isolation as a consequence of the local property, we have A t A t s if and only if A t A s . In other words, acceptance consistency is equivalent to inclusion from left to right in (3.8). The reverse inclusion, which is called the consecutivity property in [26] , is not equivalent to rejection consistency, however. The relations between various notions of consistency are indicated in the following proposition, whose proof is in the Appendix. The proof is given in the Appendix. It is also shown in the Appendix (Lemma A.5) that strong sensitivity is preserved under sequentially consistent updating.
Proposition 3.6 Let be given

Strong versus weak time consistency
The characterizations (3.4) and (3.5) of strong time consistency are often seen as having a solid intuitive foundation. In [9] , for instance, it is argued that "a violation of this condition clearly leads to capital requirements that are inconsistent over time". Also in [12] it is concluded that "the financial meaning of time consistency is based on general intuition". However, different contexts may lead to different intuitions. We present two examples below in which violations of (3.5) occur without apparent contradictions at least in our view.
Example 3.8 Consider a nonrecombining two-step binomial tree, with 1% probability for all downward branches. Let O 0 and O 1 denote the single-step worst-case operators between time 0 to time 1 and between time 1 to time 2, respectively. Define a conditional monetary valuation by
(cf. Sequential TVaR as proposed in [22] ). This conditional valuation is sequentially consistent but not strongly time consistent. Nevertheless, from a risk management perspective at 99% confidence level, these outcomes do not seem unreasonable. It is important to note that the inequality 0 .X / > 0 .Y / does not necessarily mean that an entity that holds position Y at time 0 would be happy to replace Y by X ; other criteria besides the one given by the functional 0 may also play a role in determining the attractiveness of positions.
We may compare the outcomes to the ones obtained from the strongly consistent conditional valuation that is based on the single-step operators O 0 and O 1 :
We have . In other words, strong consistency implies no distinction can be made at an anterior node between on the one hand a reserve that should be maintained at a given later node to cover a potential loss, and on the other hand a sure loss of the same size at that node.
Example 3.9
In this example we think of valuation functionals as producing ask prices for financial contracts. Consider a stochastic payoff X in the (distant) future; let 0 .X / be its ask price at time 0, and let 1 .X / denote its ask price at time 1. We can also consider the ask price at time 0 of the contract that pays 1 .X / at time 1. This contract allows the holder to buy at time 1 the asset that pays X at time T , but the holder may as well use the payoff in a different way. If the asset paying X was already bought at time 0, conversion to cash at time 1 would only be possible at the bid price of the asset at time 1, which may be considerably lower than the ask price. It would be reasonable therefore that the inequality 0 . 1 .X // > 0 .X / holds. Take ı > 0 such that 0 . 1 .X // ı > 0 .X /, and consider the contract Y that pays 1 .X / ı at time 1. Obviously we have 1 .Y / < 1 .X /, while at the same time
There appears to be no contradiction though. If the bid price of X at time 1 would be higher than the cash amount Y , then certainly X would be preferred to Y at that time, but the inequality is in terms of ask prices. As in the previous example, it seems to be essential that inequality of valuations does not necessarily imply a preference relation.
Uniqueness of updating
It is a well known fact, recalled in Proposition 2.2 above, that any given conditional monetary valuation can be viewed as the conditional capital requirement corresponding to its acceptance set. The construction of the F t -restriction, introduced in Section 3 to express conditional consistency in terms of acceptance sets, modifies a given acceptance set in a way that relates to the filtration member F t . This suggests a particular way of updating a given monetary valuation. Namely, given s 2 M s , take its acceptance set A s , construct the F t -restriction A t s , and define the F t -update of s as the conditional capital requirement that corresponds to A t s . In fact, if the update is to be conditionally consistent, this construction provides the only feasible candidate, since by definition of conditional consistency the acceptance set of the update must be equal to the F t -restriction of the acceptance set of the monetary valuation at the earlier time. Since as we have seen above conditional consistency is implied, under suitable sensitivity assumptions, by strong time consistency as well as by sequential consistency, this implies that we obtain a criterion for a given monetary valuation to be a member of a sequentially or strongly time consistent family of monetary valuations. Namely, it suffices to check whether the update that was described above has the property.
To carry out this program, we first of all need to check whether the set A t s does indeed define a conditional capital requirement. Conditions for this to be the case have been formulated in Proposition 2.2. We verify that these conditions are satisfied. 
Proof:
The inheritance of the properties of solidness and acceptance of zero is trivial. To show the conditional nonnegativity property, suppose there exists X t 2 L 1 t \ S t such that X t 6 0. Then there exist " > 0 and F 2 F t with P .F / > 0 such that 1 F X t Ä "1 F . Since X t 2 S t and F 2 F t , we have 1 F X t 2 S. By the solidness of S it then follows that "1 F 2 S, which is incompatible with the negative cone exclusion property (2.19).
It is easily verified that the proposition is applicable to the acceptance set A s of a sensitive F s -conditional monetary valuation. 
The uniqueness of updating that was already mentioned above can now be stated more formally. We know, as recalled in Proposition 2.2, that a monetary valuation is the conditional capital requirement of its acceptance set, so the refinement update provides the unique candidate for a conditionally consistent update, having A t D A t s . In view of Proposition 3.6, this must also hold for (strict) sequentially and strongly time consistent updates, under appropriate sensitivity conditions. Application of the theorem in a particular case may or may not be straightforward, depending on whether the refinement update is easily computed and the desired type of consistency can be easily verified. As an illustration, we give an example of a valuation that does not allow a conditionally consistent update. Example 4.5 Consider a nonrecombining two-step binomial tree with probability 1 2 for all branches; we use notation as in Example 3.8. Define an unconditional concave valuation
Theorem 4.4 Let a sensitive
This valuation is strongly sensitive. Calculation shows that the refinement update 1 W R 4 ! R 2 is given by
To see that the refinement update is not conditionally consistent, take X D . Consider now a dynamic monetary valuation 2 M T associated to the given filtration .F t / t 2T , that is, a family . t / t 2T such that, for each t 2 T , t 2 M t . It would be reasonable to speak of a strongly time consistent dynamic valuation if, for each s; t 2 T with s Ä t, t is a strongly time consistent update of s , and likewise for other notions of consistency. The conditions in Theorem 4.4 provide criteria for an initial valuation 0 to admit consistent updates with respect to more detailed -algebras .F t / t 2T , but it remains to be seen whether in this way a consistent family is defined, since in principle it may happen that 0 is consistent with s and also with t , but s and t are not consistent with each other. In fact simple examples show that such situations may indeed arise if the notion of consistency that is used is acceptance consistency. The same holds if one uses the notion of middle rejection consistency which is defined [20, Definition 2.1.2, Proposition 2.1.6] (cf. also [26, Theorem 3.1.5]) by the condition s .X / Ä s . t .X // for X 2 L 1 and s Ä t. In the case of conditional consistency, however, consistent updating of 0 is enough to construct a consistent family. Under strong sensitivity, the same holds for sequential consistency and for strong time consistency. This is a consequence of the following proposition. The proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.6 Let be given
Membership of consistent families
It was shown above that the refinement update provides the unique candidate for consistent updating. As shown in Example 4.5, the refinement update need not be conditionally consistent, let alone sequentially or strongly time consistent. This means that, given an unconditional valuation 0 2 M 0 , it is not in general true that this valuation is a member of a consistent family of valuations, even if we require only conditional consistency. On the other hand, as shown in the previous section, membership of such a family does follow if we can show that consistent updating of the initial valuation 0 is possible with respect to the -algebras belonging to the given filtration .F t / t 2T .
Given the uniqueness result Theorem 4.4, to decide whether or not a conditionally consistent update exists it is sufficient to compute the refinement update and to check whether it satisfies the requirements (3.6). In fact it is enough to verify acceptance consistency, as shown in the following proposition. In other words, the proposition states that if the refinement update of a given monetary valuation is not conditionally consistent, then it is in fact not even acceptance consistent. This is the situation we encountered in Example 4.5. In [26, Remark 8.2] a similar observation has been made for the class of convex risk measures.
In cases in which the computation of the refinement update and verification of acceptance consistency is not easily achieved, it is of interest to have alternative conditions for the existence of conditionally consistent updates. According to Proposition 2.2, there are five properties that need to be satisfied in order for the F t -restriction of the acceptance set A s to qualify as the acceptance set of an F t -conditional monetary valuation. The three "basic conditions" mentioned at the beginning of Subsection 2.3 are always satisfied for an F t -update of an acceptance set. The two remaining properties are F t -closedness and the F t -local property. As may be expected, the closedness property holds under a continuity assumption. The proof of the lemma below can be found in the Appendix.
is normalized, monotonic, and continuous from above, then, for any -algebra F t F , the F t -restriction of the acceptance set of is F t -closed.
The existence of conditional updates can therefore be characterized as follows for valuations that are continuous from above.
Proposition 5.3 If s 2 M s is sensitive and continuous from above, then s admits a conditionally consistent F t -update if and only if it has the following property:
. 
This property obviously implies (5.1). Conversely, suppose that (5.1) holds, and let X 2 L 1 be such that the condition on the left hand side of (5.2) is fulfilled. Take H 2 F t . The condition in (5.2) is then fulfilled also for 1 H X instead of X , and since this premise is the same as in (5.1) it follows that s .1 H X/ 0. Therefore the conclusion of (5.2) holds. Consequently (5.2) is equivalent to (5.1).
We will refer to (5.1) as the property of complementary acceptance. This criterion is considerably weaker than the F t -complementarity property of the acceptance set of s , which may be formulated as
Indeed, the premise of (5.1) implies the one in (5.3). If we require that the local property of the refinement should hold generically, that is, with respect to any filtration, then we can formulate an even simpler necessary and sufficient condition. This is a consequence of the following lemma. The property (5.4) that is used below may be called generic complementarity.
the F t -local property for all -algebras F t F if and only if the following property holds:
Proof: The sufficiency part follows from the discussion above. For the necessity, let X; Y 2 S be such that P ¹X D 0º [ ¹Y D 0º D 1. Define F D ¹X ¤ 0º 2 F , and take F t D ¹;; F; F c ; º. We have 1 F X D X 2 S and 1 F c X D 0 2 S, so that X 2 S t , and likewise Y 2 S t . By assumption the set S t has the F t -local property, so that 1
A result showing that coherent risk measures that are sensitive and continuous from above can always be updated in a conditionally consistent way was proved in the context of tree models in [22, Theorem 7.1] . A more general statement follows below. The update rule that is used for this class is known as Bayesian updating. The proposition below therefore shows that the refinement update can be viewed as a generalization of Bayesian updating to valuations that are not of the coherent ("multiple-prior") type.
Proposition 5.5 Let Q be a collection of probability measures that are all absolutely continuous with respect to the reference measure P . Define 
Using Lemma A.4 in the Appendix, we can conclude from this that E Q t X 0.
The sensitivity requirement in the proposition holds if the collection Q contains at least one measure that is equivalent to P , and requires that the convex hull of Q contains such an element, cf. [13, Corollary 3.6] .
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of sequentially consistent updates were given for the class of law-invariant concave valuations by Weber [28, Theorems 4.3 and 4.4] . The strongly time consistent families within the same class have been fully described by Kupper and Schachermayer [19] . Alternative characterizations (not requiring law invariance) are provided in the following two propositions. 
The proofs of both propositions are in the Appendix.
Dynamic compound valuations
To illustrate the construction of consistent families, we discuss in this section dynamic valuations that are constructed by means of compounding. In general, starting with some collectionˆof dynamic valuations D . t / t 2T , one can define a new dynamic valuation
It is easily verified that indeed O t 2 M t ifˆ M T . The valuation that is obtained in this way is an example of a compound valuation. The dynamic valuations obtained from (6.1) are in general not strongly time consistent, even if all dynamic valuations in the collectionˆdo have this property. Acceptance consistency holds, however; this follows from the lemma below.
Lemma 6.1 Letˆbe a collection of dynamic valuations
D . t / t 2T in M T . Define a dynamic valuation O D . O t / t 2T by (6.
1). If all dynamic valuations 2ˆare strongly time consistent, then the dynamic valuation O satisfies
1 and s Ä t.
Proof: We have
It is possible to prove in fairly general situations that even conditional consistency holds. Letˆt denote the collection of F t -conditional valuations obtained by taking the instantiations of the dynamic valuations in the collectionˆat time t:
t WD ¹ j D t for some 2ˆº:
We consider a setting in which the conditional expectation operator under the reference measure, E P s , acts as a 'central' element that can be combined with any element ofˆt , i.e., t 2ˆt ) E P s t 2ˆs .s < t/: (6.3)
Proposition 6.2 Letˆ M T be a collection of strongly time consistent dynamic valuations that satisfies (6.3). Then the dynamic valuation O defined by (6.1) is conditionally consistent.
Proof: Take s and t with 0 Ä s < t Ä T , and let X be an element of L 1 . We need to show that O t .X / 0 if and only if O s .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F t . Suppose first that O t .X / 0. For F 2 F t , we then have, by Lemma 6 
Next, assume that O t .X / 6 0. Then there must exist an element t 2ˆt , and F 2 F t such that t .1 F X/ˆ0, and, by assumption (
We prove sequential consistency under the following additional assumption, which describes a property of closure under conditional pasting:
Proposition 6.3 Under the assumption (6.4) and the assumptions of Proposition 6.2, the dynamic valuation defined by (6.1) is sequentially consistent.
Proof: We show that O s .X / D 0 for s < t and X 2 L 1 such that O t .X / D 0; sequential consistency then follows from Proposition 3.2. The inequality O s .X / 0 follows from the assumption O t .X / D 0 by Lemma 6.1.
The reverse inequality can be proved as follows. From (6.4) it follows that for any pair t ; 0 t inˆt , also their minimum min. t ; 0 t / belongs toˆt , so that the family E WD ¹ t .X / j t 2ˆt º is directed downwards. It now follows (see for instance [14, Theorem A.33] ) that there exists a sequence .
k s 2ˆs for all k, and hence O s .X / Ä 0, which we had to prove.
Example 6.4
We consider compound valuations defined in terms of entropic risk measures on a discrete time axis T D ¹0;::: ;T º. Define, for a given t 2 T and nonnegative,
For zero parameter values the right hand side is replaced by E P t , as usual. The mappings N ˇt t can subsequently be pieced together to form monetary valuations:
This recursion is a discrete-time version of the construction of families of conditional valuations in terms of backward stochastic differential equations; cf. where B is a function that specifies a "budget" for risk tolerance across the interval OEs; t. This follows from the proposition above, which is applicable under the obvious condition that the budget does not decrease if the interval is extended. We briefly indicate how this additional flexibility can be used to accommodate that two positions with the same ask price tomorrow may have different ask prices today, as argued in Example 3.9. Suppose that the bid and ask price of positions X 0 2 L 1 at t are given by resp. 0 to each outcome withˇ0 equal to the maximum tolerated value min¹c; c2˛ ˇ1º, and finally maximizing with respect toˇ1. Note the additional degree of freedom in the backward recursion, related to keeping track of the amount of "consumed" risk aversion represented byˇ1.
If one restricts attention to deterministic parameter valuesˇt 2 R, these constructions still yield conditionally consistent dynamic valuations, as claimed by Proposition 6.2. However, sequential consistency is lost in general if the number of time periods is more than two, as is easily verified by extending the example to three steps.
Conclusions
The construction of dynamic risk measures and nonlinear pricing operators that combine time consistency with reasonable levels of prudence across different time scales remains a challenging task. In this paper we have analyzed time consistency of families of monetary valuations, which are monetary risk measures under a positive sign convention. We have shown that, even under very weak interpretations of the notion of time consistency, the choice of the initial valuation already fully determines the family of valuations to which it belongs, if certain sensitivity conditions are satisfied. By considering different notions of time consistency, we obtain a categorization of monetary valuations in valuations that allow conditionally consistent updating, valuations that allow sequentially consistent updating, and valuations that allow strongly consistent updating. By means of examples related to regulation and to nonlinear pricing, we have indicated that weak forms of consistency can be motivated. We have provided characterizations of the possibility of updating in several senses, and we have given an example of the construction of consistent families which allow flexibility in the specification of prudence over time. An issue that calls for further research is the fact that the necessary and sufficient conditions that we have given for membership of consistent families are not always easy to verify. It would be desirable to have more readily verifiable necessary and/or sufficient conditions. Criteria for weak consistency in terms of dual representations are provided in [23] .
Proof: Let the assumptions of the lemma hold. If X t 6 Y t , then there exists " > 0 such that the set F D ¹Y t X t C "º has positive measure. It follows from 1
and consequently all inequalities above are in fact equalities. It then follows from the strong sensitivity of that 1 F D 0, i. e. P .F / D 0, and we have a contradiction. Finally we consider conditional concavity. It follows as in the proof of Proposition 3 in [12] that the convexity of S implies that the mapping t S is F 0 -concave, i.e., 
t , and in the same paper it is shown that the latter two properties together with F 0 -concavity imply F t -concavity [10, Remark 3.4] .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The inclusion A t A t s is equivalent to acceptance consistency as noted in the main text, and it is immediate from the definitions that acceptance consistency is implied by sequential consistency and by strong time consistency. It remains to prove that the reverse inclusion, consecutivity, holds under each of the three conditions mentioned. That is, we need to show the implication from right to left in (3.6). Take X 2 L 1 , and suppose that
Consider now each of the three conditions. 1. Take F D ¹ t .X / Ä 0º, so that 1 F t .X / Ä 0. Under strong time consistency, we can write
It follows that s .1 F t .X // D 0; sensitivity then implies that 1 F t .X / D 0, or in other words t .X / 0.
2. Take F as above. Under sequential consistency we can write, using item (ii) in Lemma 3.2:
It follows that all inequalities are in fact equalities, and strong sensitivity of s implies that 1 F t .X / D 0, i.e. t .X / 0.
3. Strict sequential consistency implies that, for X 2 L 1 such that t .X / Ä 0, we can conclude that t .X / D 0 when s .X / D 0. With F as above, the relations (A.1) imply that s .1 F X/ D 0 whereas we also have t .1 F X/ D 1 F t .X / Ä 0. It follows once more that 1 F t .X / D 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Concerning item (i), since s is sensitive, its acceptance set has the negative cone exclusion property. This property is inherited by the F t -restriction of A. s / which is the acceptance set of t , and it follows that t is sensitive as well. Item (ii) follows from Proposition 2.2. Now consider the claim concerning continuity. Suppose that .X n / n 1 is a nonincreasing sequence of elements of L 1 that converges to X 2 L 1 . By the monotonicity of t , the sequence . t .X n // n 1 is nonincreasing as well and is bounded from below by t .X /, so that we can define Z D lim n!1 t .X n /. To prove the continuity from above, we must show that Z D t .X /. We have t .X n / t .X / for all n, which already implies that Z t .X /. Because Z is the pointwise limit of a sequence of F t -measurable functions, it is itself F t -measurable, so the inequality Z Ä t .X n /, which holds for each n, may be written as t .X n Z/ 0. By conditional consistency, this means that
X Z/, the assumed continuity from above of s implies that s .1 F .X Z// 0 for all F 2 F t , which means that t .X Z/ 0. Again using the F t -measurability of Z, we conclude that t .X / Z.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.6
The property expressed in Proposition 4.6 for sequentially or strongly time consistent updating does not follow from the corresponding property for conditionally consistent updating, since we need to prove an implication that has a stronger premise but also a stronger conclusion. We therefore provide three separate proofs.
Conditional consistency
Assume that u is a conditionally consistent update of t and t is a conditionally consistent update of s . We want to show that u is also a conditionally consistent update of s , which means that u .X / 0 if and only if s .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F u . First, take X 2 L 1 such that u .X / 0. For all F 2 F u , we have t .1 F X/ 0 which implies that s .1 F X/ 0. Conversely, suppose that s .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F u . Take F 2 F u and F 0 2 F t F u ; then, since F 0 \ F 2 F u , we have s .1 F 0 1 F X/ D s .1 F 0 \F X/ 0. The fact that this holds for all F 0 2 F t implies, because t is a conditionally consistent update of s , that t .1 F X/ 0. This inequality in its turn holds for all F 2 F u , and so, because u is a conditionally consistent update of t , it follows that u .X / 0. Now assume that both u and t are conditionally consistent updates of s . We want to show that u .X / 0 if and only if t .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F u . First, take X 2 L 1 such that u .X / 0. Take F 2 F u . For all F 0 2 F t we have F \ F 0 2 F u so that s .1 F 0 1 F X/ 0. It follows that t .1 F X/ 0. Conversely, suppose that t .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F u ; then we also have s .1 F X/ 0 for all F 2 F u , so that u .X / 0.
(Strict) sequential consistency
Under strong sensitivity, the strict and non-strict versions are equivalent, cf. (3.2) . We formulate the proof for sequential consistency. If u is a sequentially consistent update of t , then it follows immediately from the definition that it is also a sequentially consistent update of s . Assume now that u is a sequentially consistent update of s , and suppose it is not a sequentially consistent update of t , due to a violation of acceptance consistency (3.1a) (the proof in case of a rejection inconsistency is analogous). Then there exists X 2 L 1 such that u .X / 0 and t .X / 6 0, so that there is an F 2 F t with P .F / > 0 and an " > 0 such that 1 F t .X / Ä "1 F . Take Á 2 .0;"/. Because F 2 F t F u , we have u .1 F .X CÁ// u .1 F .X // D 1 F u .X / 0 so that s .1 F .X CÁ// 0 by the assumed sequential consistency of u and s . The conditional monetary valuation t is also a sequentially consistent update of s , so that from t .1 F .X C Á// D 1 F . t .X / C Á/ Ä 0 it follows that s .1 F .X C Á// Ä 0. We conclude that s .1 F .X C Á// D 0. Since this holds for all 0 < Á < ", strong sensitivity of s now implies that 1 F D 0, and we have a contradiction.
Strong time consistency
Assume that u is a strongly time consistent update of t , and t of s . Then, for any In order to prove that 2 M t , it suffices [9, Remark 3.4] to prove that is normalized and monotonic, and that it satisfies the local property as well as translation invariance (i.e.
.X C m/ D .X / C m for X 2 L 1 and m 2 R). The normalization property is trivial, and monotonicity follows from an application of Lemma A.2 in the Appendix. Because is normalized, the local property is equivalent to regularity. Take G 2 F t and X 2 L 1 . We have, for all F 2 F t ,
and moreover 1 G .X / 2 L 1 t , so that .1 G X/ D 1 G .X / as was to be proved. To show translation invariance, first note that .m/ D m for all m 2 R. Now take X 2 L 1 and m 2 R. Using the translation invariance of s as well as the regularity property of which has already been proved and the property s .X / D s . .X // which is a special case of (A.3), we can write, for F 2 F t ,
Also, we have .X / C m 2 L 1 t . It follows that .X C m/ D .X / C m, and this completes the proof.
